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"WHAT DO I DO WITH THE PORN ON MY COMPUTER?":
HOW A LAWYER SHOULD COUNSEL CLIENTS ABOUT
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
Peter A. Joy* & Rodney J. Uphoff**
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a parent, and a plastic bag containing white powder falls out of
your twenty-year-old child's jacket as you move it to hang up your own jacket.
Based on what you've seen in movies and on television, you are sure the baggie
contains drugs. You confront your child, and, after she accuses you of spying on
her, she tearfully admits that the bag contains cocaine. What do you do? If you are
like most parents, even the most law-abiding, you are unlikely to march your child
down to the nearest police station. Rather, your impulse will be to destroy the
cocaine. Given your concern for your child, you are likely to take such action
without even considering whether your destruction of the cocaine might be a
crime.
Next, imagine that you are a third-year law student home on break, and you are
using your brother's computer because your laptop is not working. Your brother is
a twenty-year-old college sophomore and he is out with friends. You open his
laptop and go to Google. As you start typing an inquiry, Google suggests an inquiry
that contains the word "porn" in it. You are mildly interested because you suspect
that your brother may have been surfing porn sites. You are curious, so you look at
his photo files and see a number of photos involving nude persons, some
performing sex acts. When you see that some of the photos appear to contain
images of children, you panic. It appears that your brother may be in possession of
child pornography. You are disgusted and worried about your brother. What has he
gotten himself into? You decide to confront your brother about what you discov-
ered. He admits that he was surfing some porn websites and that he downloaded
some images. He tells you that he will not do it again and promises to delete all the
images from his laptop. You are aware, however, that even if he deletes the images,
they may still exist on the hard drive. You decide that he needs to seek some legal
advice.
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Now imagine that you are a lawyer, and the first client you see on Monday is the
parent who found the cocaine. Instead of destroying the drugs, the parent comes to
see you with the bag of cocaine and asks you what to do with it. What do you tell
your client?
After that client leaves, the next clients are the law student who clerked for you
this past summer and her brother.' They tell you that he has downloaded some
images that they think are child porn. They come to you with the laptop. The
brother says that if the images are illegal to possess, he wants to erase the files. The
sister says that she told her brother that he needed legal advice before he did
anything. What do you tell them?
For years, criminal defense lawyers and commentators have wrestled with
thorny ethical and legal issues surrounding defense counsel's obligations with
respect to handling items of physical evidence. Commentators have usually
focused on the question of whether the lawyer should take possession of physical
evidence of a crime as well as on counsel's obligations and options once the lawyer
purposively or inadvertently comes into possession of such evidence.2 After
discussing what the ethics rules and the law require concerning handling physical
evidence, commentators have generally cautioned lawyers not to take possession
of suspected contraband or possible evidence of a crime, except in very limited
situations, such as when the evidence may aid in the client's defense or its
evidentiary value is ambiguous without further examination or testing of it. 3
Rarely, however, is much attention devoted to the issue of what advice the lawyer
1. Before representing both the brother and sister, conflict-of-interest rules require that the lawyer reasonably
believe that the lawyer will be able to represent each of them competently and diligently; that the representation
not be prohibited by law; that the representation not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against the other
in the same litigation or proceeding; and that both clients give informed consent, confirmed in writing. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. For the purposes of this
Article, we assume that the lawyer in the hypothetical has resolved the potential conflict of interest and has
obtained informed consent, confirmed in writing, before starting the counseling session with the brother and
sister.
2. See generally Stephen Gillers, Guns, Fruits, Drugs, and Documents: A Criminal Defense Lawyer's
Responsibility for Real Evidence, 63 STAN. L. REv. 813 (2011) (discussing what lawyers should do with evidence
that is illegal to possess); Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Incriminating Evidence-Too Hot to Handle?, 24
CRIM. JUST. 42 (2009) (outlining ethical and legal framework for what a lawyer should do with incriminating
evidence); Norman Lefstein, Incriminating Physical Evidence, the Defense Attorney's Dilemma, and the Need for
Rules, 64 N.C. L. REv. 897 (1986) (discussing what attorneys should do with evidence that implicates their client
in a crime); Kevin R. Reitz, Clients, Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment: The Need for a Projected Privilege, 41
DUKE L.J. 572 (1992) (suggesting that lawyers should be able to assert their clients' Fifth Amendment privilege
with respect to incriminating evidence); Gregory C. Sisk, The Legal Ethics of Real Evidence: Of Child Porn on
the Choirmaster's Computer and Bloody Knives Under the Stairs, 89 WASH. L. REv. 819, 819, 822 (2014)
(examining how the law of real evidence relates to "professional responsibility, attorney-client confidentiality,
and the constitutional rights of criminal defendants"); Rodney J. Uphoff, Handling Physical Evidence: Guidance
Found in ABA Standard 4-4.6, 26 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2011) (discussing handling incriminating physical evidence);
Rodney J. Uphoff, The Physical Evidence Dilemma: Does ABA Standard 4-4.6 Offer Appropriate Guidance?, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 1177 (2011) [hereinafter Uphoff, Physical Evidence Dilemma].
3. The American Bar Association ("ABA") Criminal Justice Standards recommend practices for lawyers
handling possible evidence of a crime. Defense Function 4-4.7 provides, in pertinent part:
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should give the client if the lawyer declines to take possession of the physical
evidence.4
Indeed, commentators are largely silent when it comes to the advice a lawyer
may give to the client about what to do with contraband or possible evidence of a
crime once the lawyer has declined to accept that evidence. Two recent articles,
one by Stephen Gillers 5 and the other by Gregory Sisk,6 highlight the extent to
which scholars have stressed the pitfalls that a lawyer encounters when taking
possession of evidence, without offering much guidance once the lawyer tells the
client that the lawyer is not taking possession of evidence. Gillers's and Sisk's
articles analyze United States v. Russell,7 a case in which church leaders discov-
ered child pornography on a laptop belonging to the longtime choirmaster. The
Russell case highlights the serious consequences that a lawyer may suffer if he or
she takes possession of contraband or other evidence and does not handle it
properly.
(a) Counseling the client: If defense counsel knows that the client possesses physical evidence that
the client may not legally possess (such as contraband or stolen property) or evidence that might be
used to incriminate the client, counsel should examine and comply with the law and rules of the
jurisdiction on topics such as obstruction of justice, tampering with evidence, and protection for
the client's confidentiality and against self-incrimination. Counsel should then competently advise
the client about lawful options and obligations.
(d) Receipt of physical evidence: Defense counsel should not take possession of such physical
evidence, personally or through third parties, and should advise the client not to give such evidence
to defense counsel, except in circumstances in which defense counsel may lawfully take
possession of the evidence. Such circumstances may include:
(v) when defense counsel reasonably believes that examining or testing such evidence is necessary
for effective representation of the client.
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION at Defense Function
4-4.7 (AM. BAR Ass'N 4th ed. 2015) [Hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS]. In addition, the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers provides, in pertinent part:
With respect to physical evidence of a client crime, a lawyer:
(1) may, when reasonably necessary for purposes of the representation, take possession of the
evidence and retain it for the time reasonably necessary to examine it and subject it to tests that
do not alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence; but
(2) following possession under Subsection (1), the lawyer must notify prosecuting authorities
of the lawyer's possession of the evidence or turn the evidence over to them.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Uphoff analyzes these provisions, which permit a lawyer to take possession of potential evidence for the
purpose of testing, and he provides some examples of when doing so is advisable to render competent client
representation. See Uphoff, Physical Evidence Dilemma, supra note 2, at 1191-98.
4. See infra Part I.
5. Gillers, supra note 2.
6. Sisk, supra note 2.
7. 639 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2007).
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After the pornography was reported to the church leaders, they sealed up the
laptop and asked a lawyer, Philip Russell, for his advice.8 The church leaders and
Russell confronted the choirmaster, Robert Tate, who admitted that he had
downloaded inappropriate images.9 Tate resigned from the church,o and the
church leaders apparently preferred to allow him to retire quietly rather than to
report him to the police." Russell advised the church leaders that they could not
continue to possess the laptop with child pornography because possession of child
pornography was unlawful. 12 Russell then took possession of the laptop, returned
to his office, and destroyed the hard drive. 13 Russell later stated that he did not
know that there was-nor did he think there would be-a criminal investigation
into the choirmaster's possession of child pornography. 14
Unbeknownst to Russell, the government had started an investigation into the
choirmaster two days before the church officials and Russell confronted the
choirmaster.1 5 The choirmaster was later arrested and found with other pornogra-
phy, pleaded guilty, and cooperated with prosecutors in the case against Russell.1 6
Russell was indicted for two counts of obstruction of justice for destroying the
laptop. 17
After unsuccessfully bringing a motion to dismiss the indictment, Russell
pleaded guilty to a single count of misprision of a felony.1" Russell was sentenced
to six months of home confinement and ordered to pay a $25,000 fine.1 9 In a
subsequent disciplinary action based on his actions and conviction, Russell also
received a six-month suspension from the practice of law.2 0
In discussing the case and Russell's destruction of the hard drive, Gillers opines
that "even when a lawyer honestly believes that destruction of potential evidence is
8. Id. at 231-32.
9. Id. at 232.
10. Id.
11. Church leaders wanted to avoid embarrassment or harm to the strong national and international reputation
of the choir. See Sisk, supra note 2, at 845.
12. See id. at 844-45.
13. See id.
14. At a change-of-plea hearing, Russell stated: "[I]t was a mistake on my part, and I'm not contesting what
happened here, but I did not foresee that there was gonna be law enforcement involvement, and I apologize for
that oversight, and I freely admit everything else that I am accused of." Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing at
37, United States v. Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2007) (No. 3:07-CR-00031 (AHN)); see also Sisk,
supra note 2, at 845.
15. See Sisk, supra note 2, at 846.
16. See id. at 846-47. The former choirmaster, Robert Tate, pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography
and was sentenced to five and a half years in prison in 2008, but was given credit for cooperating with prosecutors
and was released from prison four years after he was sentenced. See id.
17. See id. at 847.
18. See id. at 847-5 1.
19. See id. at 851. Sisk points out that the felony conviction also means that Russell may not vote, hold public
office, serve on a jury, or possess a firearm. Id.
20. See id.
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lawful, the lawyer should not be the one to do it." 2 1 Gillers does not indicate what a
lawyer can or should say when talking to the client about destroying evidence.
Sisk does discuss what a lawyer may generally say when he or she believes that
destruction of potential evidence is lawful. Sisk quotes Gillers's reference to the
Russell case and adds, "In other words, the lawyer might counsel the client to
destroy the material but the lawyer should not undertake to do it herself." 2 2
Gillers also explains the difficulty that Russell faced:
The troubling aspect of Russell's case is that for a lawyer in Russell's position,
the only safe options would have been to refrain from taking possession of the
laptop or to take it and give it to the authorities despite his client's desire not to
report the choirmaster. Russell might have questioned whether he could even
have left the laptop with the church. His client would then have been guilty of
possessing child pornography. He could have warned his client of this risk, but
a warning might have led church officials to destroy the laptop themselves. The
problem becomes exponentially more complex if we imagine that the choirmas-
ter, not the church, was Russell's client.23
We agree with Gillers's assessment of Russell's safe options, but we strongly
disagree that Russell should have questioned whether he could leave the laptop
with the church leaders. The fact that a client brings contraband to a meeting with a
lawyer does not obligate the lawyer to take possession of the contraband, even if it
means the client leaves with the contraband.24 And, as we will discuss below, the
fact that a client may destroy evidence after being warned of the risk of continuing
to possess it does not mean that a lawyer should withhold information from a client
about the risks that the client faces and the options that he or she has.25
In discussing the handling of contraband in several different contexts, Gillers
contemplates the lawyer coming into possession of the contraband in every
scenario. Gillers does not discuss the type of situation that we believe is much
more likely to occur: where a client asks the lawyer for advice about what to do
with physical evidence or contraband once a lawyer declines to take possession it.
Sisk similarly does not discuss specific advice for clients when destruction of
evidence may be unlawful, though he does play out a scenario where the lawyer
advises the client that destruction is legitimate but leaves the destroying to the
client.26 Sisk does not delve into the advice itself but explains why leaving the
21. Gillers, supra note 2, at 816.
22. Sisk, supra note 2, at 851-52.
23. Gillers, supra note 2, at 835-36.
24. Indeed, in most instances, a lawyer should not take possession of contraband or evidence of a client's crime
because doing so may well trigger the obligation to turn it over to the authorities. See supra notes 2-3 and
accompanying text.
25. See infra Parts I, II, III.
26. See Sisk, supra note 2, at 822, 851-52.
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destroying up to the client is the better option.27
Like Gillers and Sisk, we are among those commentators who have focused on
advice to lawyers about handling physical evidence, 28 rather than on the other
troubling-and certainly more likely-situations, in which clients seek advice of
what to do with the contraband or other evidence of a crime that they possess. With
the proliferation of laptops, tablets, and smartphones, the number of instances in
which clients will be in possession of evidence that may be inculpatory, exculpa-
tory, or both has grown exponentially. Lawyers are increasingly being asked by
their clients-as in the two hypotheticals involving drugs and pornography, as well
as in the Russell case-what they can or should do with physical evidence or other
incriminating evidence on their computers, phones, or other devices.29
In this Article, we analyze ethics authorities, cases, and federal and state
criminal laws to explain the limits of the legal and ethical advice that a lawyer may
give. We also provide concrete examples of what a lawyer may tell a client who is
seeking practical, helpful advice. Some may disagree with our advice, preferring to
play it safe, withhold their honest assessment of how the law may apply, and
instead tell clients only what the law is. Clients deserve more, and most lawyers
are anxious to provide helpful guidance. Yet widespread uncertainty surrounds
what a lawyer may tell a client without violating the law or ethics rules, 3 0 because
ethics authorities and commentators have largely neglected this aspect of legal
representation. This Article, therefore, fills the void in legal-ethics literature on
how to be both an ethical and an effective lawyer when a client seeks straightfor-
ward advice about handling contraband or other evidence of possible crimes.
In Part I, we provide sample advice that a lawyer may give for our hypotheticals
concerning drugs and pornography. Part I also explores how that advice may be
tailored to other situations. In Part II, we review controlling ethics authorities to
demonstrate why this advice is ethical. In Part III, we analyze our sample advice in
reference to the law to demonstrate that our suggested advice does not constitute
counseling illegal activity that could expose the lawyer to criminal liability under
federal or state laws. Finally, in Part IV, we describe the advice that a lawyer might
have given when confronted with the situation in the Russell case, and then we
discuss what advice might be given to a client when dealing with evidence on
smartphones, laptops, or other electronic devices. We conclude that in many-if
27. See id. at 851-53.
28. See generally Joy & McMunigal, supra note 2; Uphoff, Physical Evidence Dilemma, supra note 2.
29. In the past ten years, we have received several inquiries from public defenders and other criminal defense
lawyers about what they should advise clients who may have evidence on cellphones, tablets, laptops, or digital
cameras. Several of the participants at the 2016 Criminal Justice Ethics Schmooze acknowledged that an
increasing number of defense lawyers are facing this issue.
30. Our experience in presenting at continuing legal education ("CLE") programs around the country, where
we also field questions and hear comments during our presentations, indicates that many lawyers now appreciate
the dangers of taking possession of contraband or physical evidence. Lawyers seem to have little idea, however,
what they can or cannot say to their clients once they decline to accept possession of an evidentiary item.
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not most-situations, providing clear advice to the client is superior to a lawyer's
either destroying incriminating physical evidence, as Russell elected to do, or
merely telling the client what the law is.
I. ADVICE TO CLIENTS ABOUT EVIDENCE OF CRIMES
Unquestionably, there are times when a person is in possession of contraband or
other evidence of crimes that, for a variety of reasons, he or she does not want to
continue to possess. In such instances, most people are likely to discard or destroy
the evidence without ever consulting a lawyer. Nonetheless, in some situations,
such as in our two hypotheticals and in the Russell case, clients may seek legal
advice regarding what to do with contraband or evidence of a crime, especially
when continued possession is a crime.
When advising a client about contraband, such as drugs or child pornography,
the lawyer is permitted to discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course
of conduct with the client.31 When neither the client nor the lawyer has any
knowledge of a pending investigation or a reasonable expectation that there will be
an investigation, this advice can-and should, in our view-include an assessment
of the risks and possible legal consequences of destroying the contraband. We
contend that the lawyer is also permitted to give an honest opinion about the
likelihood of those legal consequences under whatever course of conduct the client
might select.32 Under this set of conditions, a lawyer may ethically provide advice
that explains that continued possession of the contraband is a crime, that turning
over the contraband to law enforcement would likely result in arrest, and, in some
instances, that destruction of contraband may also be a crime. The lawyer is
ethically and legally obligated to make clear to the client that the lawyer is not
instructing the client to break the law. 3 3 Rather, by explaining the legal conse-
quences of the various courses of action available to the client, the lawyer is
providing to the client the information needed to make an informed choice about
which course of action to follow. To give this advice competently, a lawyer must
understand the applicable law and explain it to the client. The following are
examples of how that advice may be given. The sample advice is presented in
narrative form for purposes of illustration when, in reality, we anticipate that such
advice is likely to unfold in stages, with give and take between the client and
lawyer.
A. Advice to a Parent After Finding Child's Cocaine
This is a difficult situation; as I will explain, it is illegal to possess the drugs,
and it may also be illegal to destroy the drugs. I cannot and will not advise you
31. See infra Part II.
32. For an analysis of why this is permitted under prevailing ethics rules, see infra Part II.
33. See infra Parts II, III.
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to break any law, but I am going to provide you with my honest assessment of
the various options you have and the possible risks associated with those
options. As I am sure you know, it is against the law to possess cocaine.3 4 At
this point, you could be arrested if the police found the cocaine on you or in
your home. You should not continue to possess or conceal the cocaine.
If there is already an ongoing investigation into your child's possessing
cocaine, your destruction of the cocaine may violate the applicable laws
concerning destroying or tampering with evidence 3 5 or the obstruction of
36justice. That assumes, however, that the prosecutor could prove that you
knew or reasonably should have known about a pending investigation involv-
ing your child. Because you do not have any indication that there is any such
investigation at this time, it is very unlikely that you would be successfully
prosecuted if you chose to destroy the cocaine.
In addition, if you were to destroy the cocaine, then you or your child would
probably not face criminal drug-possession charges. In fact, destroying the
cocaine would substantially minimize the risk that you or your child would
ever be charged with possession of cocaine because neither you nor your child
would continue to possess the drugs.
Nevertheless, if your child got the cocaine from a police informant, then it is
possible that the police may already be investigating your child. If that
occurred, it is possible that your child will be prosecuted. On the other hand, if
your child does not purchase or accept any other drugs, then the investigation
may end. Because there is no reason to expect that there is any investigation,
there is all the more reason to believe that, as long as your child does not have
any other contact with illegal drugs, your destruction of the cocaine may end
the risk of arrest and prosecution for you and for her. Absent a pending
investigation, I do not believe that your destroying the contraband that you do
not wish to possess or have your child possess is a crime such as obstruction of
justice, destruction of evidence, or tampering with evidence.
There is another crime, however, called misprision of felony, which makes it
a crime under federal law to conceal the commission of a felony-usually a
felony committed by another person.3 7 Like a majority of states, our state does
34. The crime's classification as a felony or a misdemeanor and the range of punishment depend on the
jurisdiction and generally on the amount of cocaine involved. The client should be told specifically the level of
crime, the range of punishment, and the likely punishment if convicted of possession of the cocaine in the
jurisdiction where the advice is given.
35. For a discussion of destruction-of- or tampering-with-evidence laws, see infra Section H.A.1.
36. A lawyer giving advice about destruction of contraband should investigate the applicable law and provide
specific advice to the client based upon both state and federal statutes.
37. The federal misprision-of-felony law provides:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the
United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or
other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). As we discuss more fully in Section II.A.1, misprision of felony requires taking some act to
conceal the underlying felony, which would include destroying or concealing evidence of the underlying crime.
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not have a misprision-of-felony law.38 The act of concealing requires some
affirmative act, and destroying the cocaine could fit that definition. Before
there can be a misprision-of-felony charge, the Government has to prove the
underlying crime-here, the possession of cocaine. 3 9 If there were no cocaine,
then it would be difficult to prove possession. As a result of these requirements,
misprision of felony is a rarely prosecuted offense. Nonetheless, it may be
illegal for you to destroy the cocaine, and, as I explained at the start, I am
ethically prohibited from advising you to destroy the cocaine. It could also be a
crime for me to advise you to destroy evidence. As a lawyer, I cannot counsel
or encourage you to break the law.
On the other hand, it clearly is a crime for you or your daughter to continue
to possess the cocaine. It would also be a crime for you to return the drugs to
your daughter. And, as I mentioned earlier, it is my duty to advise you not to
continue to break the law by possessing the cocaine. Bottom line, it is a crime
if you keep the cocaine at your house, conceal it anywhere, or give it back to
your child, and it is likely a crime if you destroy it. If you decide to destroy the
cocaine and your child is caught with drugs in the future, then it is possible that
your child may tell the police that you previously destroyed some of the drugs,
so there may be some continuing risk to you if you destroy the drugs.
One legal alternative is to turn the cocaine over to the police or have me
arrange for you to do so. The police may choose to respond favorably to your
gesture and not pursue any criminal charges against you or your child.
However, if you turn the drugs over to the police or the prosecutor, then you or
your child could be arrested for possession of cocaine. In my opinion, turning
the cocaine over to the police is likely to cause you or your child to be
arrested.40 At the very least, the police will want to question your child about
where she got the cocaine, and such questioning will likely raise a host of
issues for her.
Finally, no matter what you decide to do, if your daughter or you are
approached by any law-enforcement officer and asked about drugs, then I
As we explain in Section II.A.1, misprision-of-felony charges are rarely brought against a person who has
committed the underlying felony.
38. The assumption here is that the advice is not given in one of the few states that have misprision-of-felony
statutes. Only two states, Ohio and South Dakota, have misprision-of-felony statutes, see Gabriel D. M. Ciociola,
Misprision of Felony and Its Progeny, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 697, 726-27 (2003), and violation of either statute is a
misdemeanor. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-12 (2017). Ohio's law
specifically exempts information that is privileged due to attorney-client privilege or that would tend to
incriminate a member of the one's immediate family. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(G)(1)-(2). This exception
would therefore insulate a parent who destroyed her child's drugs. South Dakota's law does not have such an
exception. Most states do not retain common-law offenses, and most courts in states where common-law offenses
still exist have rejected the common-law misprision-of-felony offense. See Ciociola, supra, at 710-21 (discussing
misprision of felony as a potential common-law offense).
39. A misprision-of-felony charge is possible only if possession of the cocaine is a felony and not a
misdemeanor. For a discussion of those states that treat possession of cocaine as a misdemeanor under some
circumstances, see infra note 67.
40. The viability of this option is likely to turn on counsel's familiarity with the policies and practices of the
prosecutors in the given jurisdiction and on counsel's relationship with individual prosecutors.
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advise you to refuse to answer any question and to tell the officer you want to
speak to your lawyer right away.
After receiving such advice, the client may well ask the lawyer:
If I understand you correctly, it seems like I will be committing a crime no
matter what I do with the cocaine. That is, unless I turn it over to the police or
have you do that. But that may mean my daughter will be charged with a crime,
and I certainly don't want that to happen. So, what do you recommend, or what
would you do if you were in my position?
The cautious lawyer may answer: "It is your call, and I do not feel comfortable
giving any recommendation. I am not in your position, so I really cannot say what I
would do. You are going to have to reach your own decision."
Few clients are likely to find this response helpful. In our view, a more helpful
approach would be for the lawyer to say what the lawyer might do but to make
clear that the lawyer is not expressly or implicitly telling the client what to do. For
example, if the lawyer would destroy the drugs, the lawyer might say:
I am not telling you what to do, but, if I were in your situation, I probably
would destroy the drugs because I wouldn't want my child caught up in the
legal system. I am not telling you to do that because, as I explained, that could
be or would be breaking the law, and I am not advising you to break any law. 4 1
The lawyer might continue by adding:
Let me be clear: I am not telling you or recommending what you should do
in this situation. As we've discussed, however, I believe there is a high
likelihood that destroying the cocaine would be the end of this problem. In
deciding what to do, you should also know that the penalties for possession of
cocaine are higher under federal law than for any federal charge that might
42
conceivably be brought against you for destruction of evidence.
41. We recognize that saying the lawyer would "probably" destroy the drugs is equivocal and that some
lawyers may be more direct in stating that they either would or would not destroy the drugs if they were in the
parent's position. We used "probably" for two reasons. First, it is difficult to know what one might do without
being in the actual situation, so stating that one would "probably" do something is accurate in that it accounts for
the uncertainty one has in predicting one's actions in a particular situation. Second, by saying "probably," the
lawyer is not telling the client that the lawyer would definitely do something that could be a crime, such as
misprision of felony. We believe that this keeps the lawyer's advice and counseling within the bounds of what is
both legal and ethical.
42. The lawyer should also discuss the comparative penalties that the client faces for destruction of the cocaine
versus a state possession charge. In many states, the penalties for the possession charge are more severe than those
for destroying or tampering with evidence. In Missouri, for example, an offender possessing cocaine faces up to
seven years for a Class D felony, while he or she faces a maximum sentence of only four years if convicted of
tampering with evidence, a Class E felony. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 558.011 (2016). In other states, however,
destruction of or tampering with evidence may be more serious than mere possession. In Kentucky, for example, a
first-time offender possessing cocaine faces a maximum of three years, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1415 (West
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As we discuss in depth later, the lawyer who engages in this type of counseling-
telling the client what the lawyer might do in a similar situation-comes close to,
but does not cross, the line between providing ethical, legal counseling and
rendering advice that is unethical, illegal, or both. That line is crossed if the lawyer
tells the client to destroy the evidence or if a reasonable person would conclude
that the lawyer is encouraging the client to do so.4 3 The lawyer should not tell a
client what the lawyer would do in the client's situation if the lawyer believes that a
reasonable person or that specific client would interpret that information as
advising or encouraging the client to commit a crime.
B. Advice Concerning Child Pornography on Brother's Laptop
The second hypothetical, involving the sister's finding child pornography on her
brother's laptop, would also start with the lawyer's explaining that she is ethically
and legally prohibited from advising the siblings to break any law. The lawyer
would then explain that she is not advising them to break any law, but rather
providing them with her honest opinion of the various options they have and the
possible risks associated with those options.t The counseling session would
proceed much the same way as the above advice to the parent about her child's
drugs, though with some important variations.
First, the lawyer should explain that, if the brother continues to possess the
laptop with the child pornography at his parents' home, he will possibly be
exposing his sister and his parents to arrest for constructive possession of child
pornography. The explanation should go like this:
If you continue to possess the laptop with the child pornography, then you
could be arrested if the police found you with the laptop. In addition, if the
police seize the laptop at your parents' home, then your parents or even your
sister might be arrested for being in constructive possession of child pornogra-
phy.4 5 Moreover, if you (referring to the sister) return the laptop to your
brother and he is subsequently arrested, then you might be charged with
delivery of child pornography if he tells the police you took his computer to a
lawyer and then gave it back to him. I must warn you that neither of you should
continue to possess or conceal child pornography.
2017), while one found guilty of tampering with evidence faces a maximum of five years, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 524.100.
43. See infra Section II.A.2. We recognize that telling a client what a lawyer thinks the lawyer may do in the
client's place is not something that every defense lawyer will feel comfortable doing. A lawyer should not do so
unless the lawyer feels comfortable that a reasonable person would not believe the lawyer was thereby advising or
encouraging the client to commit a crime. This judgment call will depend on the client, the particular facts, and the
client-attorney relationship.
44. For a discussion of the possible conflict of interest in representing both the brother and sister in this
situation, see supra note 1.
45. The police might have probable cause to arrest others in the house depending on what the brother says
regarding access of others to the computer.
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Next, the lawyer should explain that prosecuting persons with child pornogra-
phy is a high priority and that simply deleting the images does not remove them
from the laptop's hard drive. The explanation should go like this:
The arrest and prosecution of persons with child pornography is a high
priority for the government on both the state and federal levels.46 That means
that law-enforcement agents are constantly trying to determine who has child
pornography. The problem is that you do not know if the police or other
law-enforcement officials are currently investigating you. You both told me
that you are worried that someone will discover the child pornography on the
laptop and that you have considered deleting the images. If there is a pending
investigation into your (referring to the brother) downloading child pornogra-
phy, then any attempt to destroy the pornography may violate applicable laws
concerning attempted destruction of evidence and so subject you to criminal
prosecution.47
I say "attempted" destruction because deleting the images on the laptop may
not destroy proof that they were on the laptop. When a file is deleted, it remains
on the hard drive. 4 8 Even files that were not downloaded but rather simply
viewed are automatically downloaded to "cache files" or "temporary Internet
files." 4 9 While there is some special software and other devices that claim to
wipe clean a hard drive,50 the only other way to completely remove the images
is to destroy the hard drive. If you (referring to the brother) have viewed
images or downloaded images on any other computer, then those hard drives
would also contain the images.
If there isn't a current investigation involving you (referring to the brother)
and the hard drive is destroyed, then that should end your risk of being charged
with possession of child pornography if you do not view or download child
pornography again. Because neither of you have any reason to expect that there
is any ongoing investigation, it may be reasonably safe to assume that, as long
as you do not continue to view or download child pornography, completely
erasing or destroying the hard drives on every computer where you have
viewed the images may end the risk of arrest and prosecution.
Third, the lawyer should explain that misprision of felony normally does not
apply when a person destroys evidence of his or her own crime. In the pornography
46. See Child Porn Prosecutions Soaring in U.S., DENVER POST (Feb. 5, 2011, 3:16 PM), https://perma.ccIW2
PN-JS85 (explaining the dramatic increase in state and federal prosecutions of child pornography).
47. A lawyer giving advice about destruction of contraband should investigate the applicable law and provide
specific advice to the client based upon the law concerning possible obstruction-of-justice or misprision-of-felony
charges in the jurisdiction.
48. It remains on the hard drive in what is known as "the unallocated space." Georgia Sex Offense Law: What
Constitutes "Possession" of Child Pornography?, BRODY LAw FiRM, https://perma.cc/287G-H4L5 (last visited
Feb. 20, 2017). This means that the user does not see the file but the file can still be accessed using forensic
software such as EnCase. Id.
49. Id.
50. There is both software and hardware that can completely erase a hard drive. Tim Fisher, How to Completely
Erase a Hard Drive, LiFEwiRE (Oct. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/SES3-ZFYR.
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hypothetical, that means that the brother may be able to destroy the hard drive
without violating the misprision-of-felony law, even though it may be a crime for
the sister to do so. Here is an example of that advice:
Absent a pending investigation, I do not believe that your destruction
(referring to the brother) of the contraband that you do not wish to possess is a
crime such as obstruction of justice. There is another crime, however, called
misprision of felony, which makes it a crime under federal law to conceal the
commission of a felony.5 1 In our state, there is no such crime.5 2 The act of
concealing a crime requires some affirmative act, and destroying all the images
or the hard drive could fit that definition. To be convicted of this crime,
however, most legal authority also requires that one conceal the crime of
another, so it is unlikely that this possible charge could be brought against you
(referring to the brother) if you destroy the images or the hard drive yourself.
Also, before there can be a misprision-of-felony charge and conviction, the
Government has to prove the underlying crime-here, the possession of child
pornography. If there is no child pornography, then it will be difficult to prove
possession. Because of these requirements, misprision of felony is rarely
prosecuted as an offense. Based on these considerations, it seems unlikely that
it would be illegal for you (referring to the brother) to destroy the pornographic
images by erasing or destroying the hard drive.
Because I cannot be 100% certain that it is not a crime, I am ethically and
legally prohibited from telling you to destroy the images or counseling you to
have anyone else do so. On the other hand, your continued possession of the
laptop with the pornographic images is definitely a crime, and I advise both of
you not to continue to possess any images of child pornography. Indeed, under
federal law, it is a more serious crime with more significant penalties to possess
child pornography than to destroy evidence of a crime. The same is true under
state law in our state.53
Finally, if you (referring to the sister) decide to turn the laptop over to the
police, then your brother will be arrested for possession of child pornography,
and you may also face possible arrest for possession of child pornography. In
my opinion, turning the laptop with the images over to the police would cause
your brother and possibly you to be caught up in the criminal-justice system. It
may also affect your ability to be admitted to practice law.
After receiving such advice, these clients are likely to ask the lawyer what
he or she would do. As we discussed previously, the lawyer may state what he or
she would do but must emphasize that he or she is not advising the clients
51. For a discussion of misprision of felony under federal and state laws, see supra notes 37-38; infra Section
II.A.1.
52. For a discussion of how few states have misprision-of-felony laws, see supra note 38.
53. For a discussion of the comparative penalties for destruction of evidence and for the underlying offense,
see supra note 42.
2017] 763
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
to break any law. 5 4
C. Giving Meaningful Advice to Clients
As the foregoing discussion of the advice to clients in the hypotheticals
indicates, advice concerning evidence of a crime requires a lawyer to be well
versed in the applicable law. If, for example, the evidence is a small amount of
marijuana, the possession of which would be only a misdemeanor under state law,
then there is no need to counsel the client concerning misprision of felony.
Similarly, there is no need to explore a possible state charge of misprision of felony
if the state is among the majority of jurisdictions that do not have such a law.
As Sisk concludes in his article discussing the Russell case, there may be some
situations where a lawyer may be able to simply advise a client to destroy the
contraband because doing so would not violate any applicable law.5 5 Before giving
such advice, the lawyer must carefully review all possible federal and state
criminal offenses that may apply.
In giving the advice in all these situations, we recommend that the lawyer
document what is said in case the client should discuss the conversation with
someone else and mischaracterize the lawyer's advice. Depending on the client,
the lawyer may wish to have a law clerk, paralegal, or investigator present to
witness what is said to the client. Some lawyers may wish to record the discussion,
but raising the issue of recording the session with the client may well interfere with
the client-lawyer relationship. 6 Given the significance of the client's decision and
the real possibility that a client's decision to destroy contraband or other evidence
of a crime will not be well received should law enforcement later learn of the
destruction, counsel should take appropriate measures to memorialize the advice
proffered to the client by writing a detailed memo to the file that accurately reflects
the advice. As in any situation, the advice that a lawyer gives should be candid, but
the lawyer should also be sufficiently confident in the advice that he or she would
be willing to stand by it should it be made public.
The practical implication of the suggested advice in both hypotheticals is that
both the parent and the brother may well destroy the contraband. Some may say
54. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
55. See Sisk, supra note 2, at 851-53.
56. Asking to tape a session may alarm some clients and undermine the trust that counsel is seeking to build. A
lawyer in most states may secretly record the conversation, since federal law and more than two-thirds of state
statutes permit taping conversations if one party consents. See PETER A. Joy & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, Do No
WRONG: ETHICS FOR PROSECUTORS AND DEFENDERS 106 (2009). Secret taping, however, raises ethical concerns.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not explicitly address covert recording by a lawyer, but secret
recordings, especially of clients, implicate several ethical standards-for example, under Model Rule 8.4, it is
"professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresen-
tation." MODEL RULES, supra note 1, r. 8.4. A lawyer also owes a duty of loyalty to a client, which weighs against
secretly recording advice to a client, and state advisory ethics opinions are divided over whether it is unethical for
a lawyer to secretly record a conversation with a client. See JoY & MCMUNIGAL, supra, at 109.
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that, by discussing the law and risks in detail with the clients, the lawyer in the two
hypotheticals is improperly counseling each client to destroy the contraband.
Others may say that, in fact, the lawyer has unethically assisted both clients in
engaging in criminal conduct. We disagree. The next section demonstrates that the
advice given to each client is ethical.
II. THE ETHICS OF ADVISING CLIENTS ABOUT CONTRABAND
There are several places to which a lawyer would turn to understand the ethical
limitations on advising a client about handling contraband: principally, the
jurisdiction's rules of ethics and cases interpreting the rules, the ABA Criminal
Justice Standards, and the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. As we will
demonstrate, these sources provide general guidance, but they do not provide a
clear roadmap to lawyers on the advice they may give a client who is contemplat-
ing what to do with contraband or other evidence of a crime.
A. Rules of Professional Conduct
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,5 7 upon which virtually all jurisdic-
tions' ethics rules are modeled,5" draws an important distinction in describing how
a lawyer is to counsel a client. Model Rule 1.2(d) states:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel
or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope,
meaning or application of the law.5 9
As Comment 9 to Model Rule 1.2 explains:
[This] does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the
actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor
does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or
fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a
critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of question-
able conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be
committed with impunity.60
The original draft version of Model Rule 1.2(d) did not contain the language that a
lawyer could "discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct
57. MODEL RULES, supra note 1. The ABA adopted the Model Rules in 1983, and the Model Rules replaced the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which the ABA adopted in 1969. STEPHEN GWLERS ET AL.,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 4 (2013).
58. Today, all states except California and the District of Columbia have adopted the number system and most
of the language in the Model Rules. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 57, at 3.
59. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, r. 1.2(d).
60. Id. r. 1.2 cmt. 9 (emphasis added).
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with a client."6 1 This language was added through an amendment, and proponents
believed it was necessary because "the Rule as [originally] proposed . .. could
operate to characterize the mere discussion of illegal conduct as assistance in a
client's crime or fraud, and thus inhibit effective counsel." 62 Thus, the intent of the
final version of Model Rule 1.2(d) is clear-counsel may ethically discuss the
possible legal consequences of illegal conduct.
Furthermore, Model Rule 2.1, which defines the role of a lawyer as advisor,
requires that a lawyer "render candid advice" and states that, in doing so, "a lawyer
may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."6 3 A
comment to this rule also states that "[a] client is entitled to straightforward advice
expressing the lawyer's honest assessment."64 We believe that, read together,
Model Rules 1.2 and 2.1 require a lawyer counseling clients about evidence of
crimes to explain various options and likely consequences.
Advising a client of the possible consequences of violating the law, even when a
client may use that information to decide to violate the law, was the subject of the
Blue Law Cases hypotheticals, which Monroe Freedman used to illustrate how
Model Rule 1.2 gave lawyers a degree of discretion in advising clients. 5 In a
series of three hypotheticals, Freedman illustrated how information about the law,
possible penalties, and the law's likely interpretation could lead some clients to
engage in a cost-benefit analysis of lawbreaking. Freedman concludes that, even
when a client may use the advice in deciding that the risk of violating the law was
worth the benefit, Model Rule 1.2 permits the lawyer to give advice provided the
lawyer does not "counsel a client to engage in unlawful conduct."6 6 Thus, the first
question to consider is whether destroying contraband or other evidence is a crime;
61. AM. BAR Ass'N CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1982-2005 at 44 (2006).
62. Id.
63. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, r. 2.1.
64. Id. r. 2.1 cmt. 1.
65. The original version of the Blue Law Cases appeared in 1990, in the first edition of a book about lawyer
ethics by Monroe Freedman. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 143-47 (1st ed. 1990).
The analysis was updated in later editions. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'
ETHICS § 7.01 (4th ed. 2010). In the Blue Law Cases, a lawyer is advising a client who owns a chain of liquor
stores near the state line, in a state that recently passed a law that does not permit the stores to stay open on
Sundays. Id. In the adjoining state, there are also several liquor stores, and that state's law permits them to stay
open. Id. The client is incurring a loss of business and wants to know what the penalty would be if the client's
stores stayed open on Sunday. Id. In Blue Law Case #3, the lawyer goes beyond giving the client an honest
opinion of the likely consequences of violating the law and provides the client with an estimate of the odds of
convincing the state supreme court that "each violation" of the law in the penalty clause refers to each Sunday a
store remains open and does not refer to each sale made on a Sunday. Id. In the first edition, Freedman states that
Model Rule 1.2 permits the lawyer "to propose that the client violate the law in order to determine what the
penalty clause means." FREEDMAN, supra, at 146. Thus, in later editions of his book, it appears that Freedman
backed off this claim concerning the extent to which Model Rule 1.2 would permit such advice.
66. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 65, § 7.02.
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if so, the next question is whether apprising a client of the law, possible penalties,
and how the law would likely be interpreted constitutes counseling a client to
engage in breaking the law.
1. Is Destruction of Contraband a Crime?
Is destroying contraband, such as illegal drugs, a crime? In our first hypotheti-
cal, it may be a crime for the parent to destroy the child's drugs because possessing
some drugs, like cocaine, is a felony in most states6 7 and under federal law.6" Thus,
destroying a drug such as cocaine could fit the definition of a "misprision of
felony" under federal law 6 9 and under state law, if the state is among the minority
of states that have a misprision-of-felony statute or recognize misprision of felony
as a common-law offense.7 0
The federal statute provides that one having knowledge of a felony who
"conceals and does not as soon as possible make known" the commission of a
felony may be guilty of misprision of felony.7 1 Courts have interpreted this as
requiring a defendant to engage in an affirmative act to conceal the underlying
felony, "such as making a false statement to an investigator, seeking to divert the
attention of the police, harboring a felon, or retrieving and secreting proceeds of
evidence of a crime."7 2
In order to bring and successfully prosecute a misprision-of-felony charge, "the
government must prove that the principal perpetrator actually committed the
offense the defendant is alleged to have covered up." 7 3 That means that, in our first
hypothetical, the Government would have to prove that the parent's child has
possessed the cocaine, which would be difficult if in fact the cocaine were
destroyed and neither the child nor the parent ever admitted to possessing or
destroying the cocaine. In the second hypothetical-involving the possible destruc-
tion of the images or the hard drive containing child pornography-whether it is a
felony under state or federal law would likely depend on who destroys the
evidence.
67. Some states treat the possession of small amounts of cocaine as a misdemeanor. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-3401 to 13-3423, 36-2501 to 36-2553 (2016) (stating that courts can treat the possession of a small
amount of cocaine as a misdemeanor if the defendant has no prior felony convictions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 4701-4799 (2017) (stating that possession, use, or consumption of cocaine is a misdemeanor); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAw § 5-601 (West 2017) (treating possession of cocaine as misdemeanor); 35 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 780-101 to 780-144 (2016) (treating first-time possession of cocaine as misdemeanor). A majority of states,
however, treat possession of cocaine as a felony. See generally 50 State Statutory Surveys: Illegal Drugs: Cocaine
(2007), 0030 SURVEYS 1 (Westlaw).
68. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2012).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); see supra note 37.
70. Only two states have misprision-of-felony statutes, and only a handful more recognize misprision of felony
as a common-law offense. See supra note 38.
71. 18 U.S.C.§4.
72. Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 23 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. (citing United States v. Davila, 698 F.2d 715, 717 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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In the case in which Philip Russell destroyed the choirmaster's laptop with child
pornography, Russell pleaded guilty to the federal misprision-of-felony offense,
which requires knowledge of the commission of a felony by another, failure to
report the felony to the authorities, and taking steps to conceal the crime. All
these elements were met in the Russell case and would also be met in the
hypothetical if the sister, instead of the brother, destroyed the hard drive of her
brother's laptop.
In our second hypothetical, however, the lawyer is also counseling the brother,
who possessed the pornography. It is unlikely that the brother's destruction of his
own contraband would be a crime because, except for "a handful of cases holding
that a defendant who takes affirmative steps to conceal his own crime has
committed misprision, the usual rule has been that such prosecutions are barred by
the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compelled self-incrimination."
Thus, the likelihood of charges for misprision of felony is slim in either
hypothetical, where there is the destruction of contraband that is illegal to possess,
even though the destruction of the contraband could be a crime in itself. One
commentator, Stuart Green, notes that, in analyzing prosecutions for covering up
crimes, misprision of felony "appears to be the least favored of all the criminal
offenses being considered here."7 Nevertheless, while the brother faces virtually
no risk of being successfully prosecuted, his sister and the parent face some risk
should the sister destroy the pornography or the parent destroy the cocaine.
Other federal and state laws also prohibit tampering with, destroying, altering,
or concealing evidence. There is a great deal of variation in what these laws
prohibit,7" but most statutes follow the Model Penal Code and require the
Government to prove that one has destroyed, altered, or concealed material while
"believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be
instituted." 7 9 So, in our hypotheticals, neither the parent, nor the law student, nor
the brother would likely be subject to tampering or destruction-of-evidence
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 4. The Sixth Circuit has held that this requires proving four elements beyond a reasonable
doubt: "(1) the principal committed and completed the felony alleged; (2) the defendant had knowledge of the
fact; (3) the defendant failed to notify the authorities; and (4) the defendant took affirmative steps to conceal
the crime of the principal." United States v. Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1988). "Mere knowledge of
the commission of the felony or failure to report the felony, standing alone, is insufficient to support a conviction
for a misprision of a felony." Id. Unquestionably, a lawyer who learns from a client about that client's commission
of a crime has no duty report such crime to the authorities. To the contrary, that information is protected by the
attorney-client privilege and the lawyer's ethical duty to maintain a client's confidences. Only when a lawyer
takes affirmative steps to conceal the client's crime may counsel be subject to prosecution for misprision of
felony.
75. Green, supra note 72, at 23-24 (footnotes omitted).
76. Id. at 24.
77. See Joy & McMunigal, supra note 2, at 43.
78. See id.
79. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.6 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 118 cmt. c
("Obstruction of justice and similar statutes generally apply only when an official proceeding is ongoing or
imminent.").
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statutes, unless the prosecution could prove they knew that there was a pending
investigation or that an investigation, into either the daughter's cocaine possession
or the brother's possession of child pornography, was likely.so Given the great
variation in the statutes, though, it is extremely important for a lawyer to be
familiar with all the applicable laws in the jurisdiction in which the advice is given.
2. Is Advising a Client of the Law, Penalties, and Risk of Enforcement in
Destroying Contraband "Counseling a Client to Engage in Unlawful
Conduct"?
A leading ethics treatise, The Law of Lawyering, states that the dividing line
between permissible and impermissible counseling of clients in Model Rule 1.2(d)
is this: "while a lawyer may discuss, explain, and predict the consequences of
proposed conduct that would constitute crime or fraud, a lawyer many not counsel
or assist in such conduct."8 1 As the treatise notes, it is difficult to apply this
standard or to answer the question: "At what point does conveying accurate
information about legal matters turn into encouragement or facilitation?" 8 2
Although we agree that the standard is not easy to apply, there are some critical
distinctions that can be drawn. The most significant factor is what the lawyer tells
the client. If the lawyer encourages or instructs the client to destroy the evidence
when doing so would be a crime, then the lawyer has clearly crossed the line and
has violated Rule 1.2.
Another key factor is the lawyer's intent. Is the lawyer providing an analysis of a
gray area of the law, explaining where the line between legal and illegal conduct is
drawn so that the client can make an informed choice how to proceed? Or is the
lawyer providing advice to a client while knowing that the client intends to put that
advice to improper use? The first lawyer has not violated Model Rule 1.2(d), but
the second lawyer has.
Another distinction is the nature of the advice. Is the lawyer providing advice
about the law in order to facilitate, command, or assist the client in some possible
future crime? Or is the lawyer providing advice to help the client understand
options concerning a possible past or continuing crime? If the client is seeking
advice about a future crime, such as how best to engage surreptitiously in money
laundering, then a lawyer should be very wary of providing information that may
assist the client with intended criminal activity. Doing so may well turn the lawyer
into an accomplice.8 3 If the lawyer is providing advice about a past or continuing
crime, such as illegal possession of drugs or pornography, as in our hypotheticals,
80. For a more detailed discussion of the potentially applicable laws, see infra Part III.
81. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 6.22 (4th ed. 2014) (hereinafter THE LAW OF
LAWYERING).
82. Id.
83. In a landmark decision, Judge Learned Hand explained that the doctrine of complicity developed in
common law so that one who "procured, counselled, commanded or abetted" a felony may be held liable for the
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then the lawyer has a legitimate counseling function to perform, even if there is no
official proceeding and no investigation is pending or imminent. In such a
situation, The Law of Lawyering provides that the "lawyer may discuss, explain,
and predict the consequences of proposed conduct that would constitute crime or
fraud," provided the lawyer does "not counsel or assist in such conduct." 8 4 In
addition, Model Rule 2.1 requires a lawyer to "render candid advice" in counseling
a client, 5 which, a comment to the rule explains, should include the lawyer's
honest assessment of the client's situation. 8 6
The Law of Lawyering poses a hypothetical concerning a lawyer who is advising
a mother whose son has been charged with murder about what to do with a bloody
shirt that she believes her son was wearing on the night of the crime. The treatise
states that the lawyer "must walk the fine line between describing the criminal law
accurately and implicitly urging its violation.""" The treatise continues that the
lawyer "should state what [the mother's] duty is, but then go on to give his opinion
of the risks of noncompliance. The ultimate decision whether to comply or risk
discovery and prosecution would then remain with [the mother]."89
Another comment to Rule 1.2 provides some insight into what constitutes
"assisting" a client, with the example of the lawyer's "drafting or delivering
documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or ... suggesting how the
wrongdoing might be concealed." 90 The plain language of this comment appears to
require an affirmative act to further the client's course of action, or the creation of a
plan to conceal the client's wrongdoing. Exactly what "suggesting" means is
unclear, though it is coupled with the example of the lawyer's taking some
concrete action, so it appears to require more than a lawyer's advising a client of
risks of various courses of action. The primary dictionary definitions for "suggest"
include "to mention or imply as a possibility," "to propose as desirable or fitting,"
and "to offer for consideration or as a hypothesis." 91
felony. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d. Cir. 1938); see infra note 153 (discussing the Model Penal
Code definition of accomplice and the federal law defining an accessory to a crime).
84. THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 81, § 6.22.
85. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, r. 2.1.
86. "A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice
often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront." Id. r. 2.1 cmt. 1.
87. THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 81, § 33.17. In the hypothetical, the lawyer is representing the son
when the mother comes to see the lawyer with the shirt. The authors note that, before giving the mother any
advice, the lawyer would have to obtain informed consent of both the son and the mother. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, r. 1.2 cmt. 10.
91. Suggest, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://perma.cc/2FGS-N9S7 (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
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Joel Newman characterizes Model Rule 1.2(d) as "a rule of syntax" 92 and states
that, in applying the rule, "everything turns upon the exact words used." 93 He
explains:
If the lawyer uses the command form of the verb, then the lawyer is
"counseling or assisting a criminal act" and should be disciplined. On the other
hand, if the lawyer merely answers the client's questions, then she is "discuss-
ing the consequences of a proposed course of conduct" and should not be
disciplined.9 4
Our review of disciplinary cases considering alleged violations of state versions
of Model Rule 1.2(d) found eighty-seven cases over approximately twenty years,
and the vast majority of those cases deal with lawyers who assisted clients in
violating the law or committing fraud. 95 Examples include assisting a former client
96in breaking into his spouse's home during pending divorce litigation, soliciting a
potential client to engage in sex in exchange for legal services, 97 representing a
client in court proceedings when the lawyer knew the client was using a false
identity,9 8 preparing bogus checks for a client to endorse for deposit into the
lawyer's account as payment for attorney fees,99 facilitating the forgery of estate
documents by a child of a client who was not competent to execute the docu-
ments, 00 and having a client sign fraudulent promissory notes and false certifica-
tions during divorce proceedings that the lawyer then filed with the court.1 o
In the few cases dealing with advising or counseling clients, disciplinary
authorities have found violations of state versions of Model Rule 1.2(d) only when
the lawyer directs or recommends that the client violate the law or commit fraud.
Examples include counseling clients on how to unlawfully avoid tax consequences
of interest earned from settlement monies, 10 2 asking a client to obtain cocaine for
the lawyer, 10 3 counseling a client to offer real estate to witnesses in exchange for
false testimony,1 04 advising a client to disclose confidential court records in
violation of a state statute, 05 advising a client to commit credit-card fraud to pay
92. Joel S. Newman, LegalAdvice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 287, 290 (1994).
93. Id. at 297.
94. Id. at 290-91.
95. Using Westlaw, we found eighty-seven professional-discipline cases involving allegations of a violation of
the states' versions of Model Rule 1.2(d) between July 8, 1986, and February 2, 2016.
96. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Protokowicz, 619 A.2d 100, 102 (Md. 1993).
97. See In re Hollander, 27 N.E.3d 278, 279 (Ind. 2015) (stating that an undercover police officer posed as a
potential client when the respondent solicited her for sex in exchange for legal services).
98. See In re Laterzo, 908 N.E.2d 610, 610 (Ind. 2009).
99. See In re Feeley, 581 S.E.2d 487, 487-88 (S.C. 2003).
100. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Coppola, 19 A.3d 431, 438-39 (Md. 2011).
101. See In re Lowell, 14 A.D.3d 41, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
102. See Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility v. Fulton, 133 P.3d 514, 517-18 (Wyo. 2006).
103. See In re Discipline of Wolff, No. 59565, 2012 WL 5989283, at *2 (Nev. Nov. 28, 2012).
104. See People v. Gifford, 76 P.3d 519, 519-20, 522 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2003).
105. See In re Werme's Case, 839 A.2d 1, 2 (N.H. 2003).
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attorney fees,1 0 6 and counseling clients to engage in prostitution to earn money to
pay attorney fees.1 0 7 In each of these disciplinary cases, the lawyer specifically
directed or expressly recommended that the client violate the law or commit fraud.
Our advice to lawyers counseling clients about evidence of crimes is consistent
with the ethics rules and the way disciplinary authorities have interpreted and
applied the rules: never recommend that a client violate the law or commit fraud.
Thus, under the ethics rules and the way disciplinary authorities have applied state
versions of Model Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer may advise the parent of the law and the
risks involved in destroying the child's drugs. The same holds true in advising the
law student and her brother concerning destroying all traces of the child pornogra-
phy on her brother's laptop.
In ethically counseling clients about the evidence of crimes, the lawyer is also
permitted to give an honest opinion about the actual consequences that are likely to
result.os If either or both clients use the lawyer's advice to destroy the drugs or the
child pornography, and if that destruction is later determined to be criminal, then
giving the advice does not itself make the lawyer a party to any possible crime.1 09
Model Rule 1.2(d) draws the line at counseling a client to engage "in conduct that
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent." 10
In short, unless the lawyer is certain that the destruction of either the cocaine or
the images of child pornography will not violate any state or federal law, then the
lawyer must not direct or counsel a client to destroy evidence or contraband.
Rather, defense counsel should limit advice to an analysis of applicable laws and
the lawyer's "honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to
result from a client's conduct.""' This is the precise advice that we provided for
the hypotheticals in Part I.
B. Criminal Justice Standards
The American Bar Association promulgated the Criminal Justice Standards to
provide guidance for prosecutors and defense lawyers. 1 12 Courts across the
106. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Culver, 849 A.2d 423, 434 (Md. 2004).
107. See In re Discipline of Olkon, 795 F.2d 1379, 1384 (8th Cir. 1986). This was an appeal of the Minnesota
federal district court's denial of the lawyer's application for readmission to the federal bar. See In re Petition of
Olkon, 605 F Supp. 784 (D. Minn. 1985). The underlying conduct of counseling clients to engage in prostitution
took place in 1980, and the district court analyzed Olkon's conduct under both Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) of
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibited a lawyer from counseling a client to engage in
criminal conduct, and Model Rule 1.2(d). See id. at 789-90.
108. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, r. 1.2 cmt. 9.
109. See id.; see also Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence
and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1548 (1995) ("There are no reported cases of civil or criminal
liability on the part of the lawyer, or of professional discipline, clearly based only upon providing the client with
accurate legal information.").
110. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, r. 1.2(d).
111. Id. r. 1.2 cmt. 9.
112. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 3.
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country, including the Supreme Court, have looked to the Standards in assessing
the propriety of a criminal defense lawyer's conduct, and courts consider the
Standards as expressing the norms for criminal defense practice. 1 13 Prosecutors
and defense lawyers also look to the Standards "in guiding their own conduct, and
in training and mentoring colleagues." 1 4 Defense Function 4-5.1 provides some
guidance when advising a client generally, but does not address how to advise a
client who asks about contraband or other physical evidence of a crime.1 1 5
Prior to February 2015, Defense Function 4-4.6, entitled "Physical Evidence,"
provided guidance to defense lawyers on handling physical evidence. 1 1 6 In the
latest edition of the Standards, Defense Function 4-4 replaced that provision and is
now entitled "Handling Physical Evidence with Incriminating Implications." The
new provision offers lawyers considerably more assistance in structuring their
discussion of how to handle incriminating evidence. Defense Function 4-4.7
states, in relevant part:
(a) Counseling the client: If defense counsel knows that the client possesses
physical evidence that the client may not legally possess (such as contraband
or stolen property) or evidence that might be used to incriminate the client,
counsel should examine and comply with the law and rules of the jurisdiction
on topics such as obstruction of justice, tampering with evidence, and protec-
tion for the client's confidentiality and against self-incrimination. Counsel
should then competently advise the client about lawful options and obligations.
(b) Permissible actions of the client: If requested or legally required,
defense counsel may assist the client in lawfully disclosing such physical
evidence to law enforcement authorities. Counsel may advise destruction of a
physical item if its destruction would not obstruct justice or otherwise violate
the law or ethical obligations. Counsel may not assist the client in conduct that
113. As one scholar has stated:
Courts at various state and federal levels have relied upon-or at least cited to-various Criminal
Justice Standards well over 3200 times. Significantly, in Strickland v. Washington, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted that the Standards provide reliable guidance as to "prevailing norms of
practice" and "guides to determining what is reasonable criminal defense attorney performance."
Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and Defense
Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1113 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
114. Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of Excellence, 23 CRIM.
JUST. 10, 12 (2009).
115. Defense Function 4-5.1, Advising the Client, states:
(d) In rendering advice to the client, counsel should consider the client's desires and views, and
may refer not only to law but also to other considerations such as moral, economic, social or
political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation. Counsel should attempt to distinguish
for the client between legal advice and advice based on such other considerations.
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 3, Defense Function 4-5.1.
116. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION,
Defense Function 4-4.6 (3d ed. 1993).
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counsel knows is unlawful, and should not knowingly and unlawfully impede
efforts of law enforcement authorities to obtain evidence. 17
Thus, the Criminal Justice Standards contemplate a lawyer's providing competent
advice about lawful options and obligations to a client seeking advice about
contraband. When destruction of the contraband is not a crime-for example,
when there is neither a pending investigation nor a reasonable expectation of an
imminent investigation, and the destruction of the drugs would not constitute
misprision of felony-the Standards indicate that a lawyer may advise the client to
destroy the drugs." This would be true if the crime involved were a misdemeanor,
such as possession of a small amount of marijuana under federal law and most
states' laws.1 1 9 A lawyer may not assist a client, however, in taking unlawful
action, such as destroying contraband or advising the client to destroy contraband
where the destruction of the contraband is a crime. 1 2 0 Thus, the Standards would
not allow the lawyer in either of our hypotheticals to counsel the parent to destroy
the cocaine or to urge the sister to delete the child pornography. Nevertheless, like
the Model Rules, the Standards do permit the lawyer to give the parent and sister
advice about the law, their options, and likely consequences. And, assuming that
the lawyer does not know or reasonably believe that an investigation is pending,
imminent, or likely, the lawyer could counsel the brother to destroy the hard drive
or delete the images on his laptop. 1 2 1
C. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
Another source of guidance for lawyers is the Restatement of the Law Govern-
ing Lawyers. While the Restatement is not binding or primary authority, it is
persuasive secondary authority. 1 2 2 As Stephen Gillers points out, however, the
117. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 3, Defense Function 4-4.7(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
118. Indeed, Standard 4-4.7(j)(ii) says that, when counsel reasonably believes that the contraband does not
relate to a pending investigation, counsel may take the contraband from the client and destroy it. Id. Defense
Function 4-4.7(j)(ii).
119. Federal law "punishes possession [of marijuana] for personal use as a misdemeanor subject to up to one
year in federal prison." Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA
L. REv. 74, 109 (2015). Several states make possession of small amounts of marijuana punishable only by a fine,
and many other states punish possession of marijuana more leniently than the federal law. Id. "Since 1996
twenty-three states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes and in November 2013 Colorado and
Washington State went even further, legalizing marijuana for adult recreational use." Id. at 77.
120. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, r. 1.2(d).
121. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
122. Restatements are influential with the courts but are not as authoritative as statutes or judicial precedent.
See THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 81, § 1.22. Some Restatements such as "Restatements in the subjects of
Property, Torts, Contracts, and Conflicts of Law have been very influential in the courts and have made their way
into the law reports and then into law school casebooks." Id. It is unclear how persuasive the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers will be, but some authorities believe it will be substantial. See id.
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Restatement "is spare and unhelpful" when it comes to offering guidance to
lawyers on handling evidence of a client crime. 12 3 Only one provision discusses
physical evidence of a client crime, and it addresses only taking possession of the
evidence "to examine it and subject it to tests that do not alter or destroy material
characteristics of the evidence."'2 If the lawyer takes possession, then "the lawyer
must notify prosecuting authorities of the lawyer's possession of the evidence or
turn the evidence over to them." 1 2 5
In our hypotheticals, there is no need for the lawyer to test the cocaine and
therefore no need to take possession of it. As for looking at the images on the
computer, we reject the notion that looking at an item of evidence on the computer
constitutes taking possession of it. If that were the law, then lawyers in a host of
situations, by merely examining documents, emails, or texts on a cellphone, would
be obligated to turn over that evidence to state or federal authorities if counsel's
review of the document indicated that it was evidence that might support a
criminal charge against the client. 126 Such a broad definition of possession would
eviscerate a client's right to access to legal advice because the client's handing
over any item of evidence to a lawyer for even a brief inspection or cursory
examination would necessitate the lawyer's turning that evidence over to the
authorities if the lawyer believed the evidence was in some manner incriminating. 127
Another provision of the Restatement addresses a lawyer's general obligations
in advising a client. Section 94 states, in pertinent part: "For purposes of
professional discipline, a lawyer may not counsel or assist a client in conduct that
the lawyer knows to be criminal or fraudulent or in violation of a court order with
123. Gillers, supra note 2, at 848.
124. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 119(1).
125. Id. § 119(2).
126. See id. § 119 cmt. a (stating that evidence under this section covers documents and material in
electronically retrievable form). As Couch v. United States makes clear, documents turned over to a lawyer or an
accountant can be considered no longer in the possession of the taxpayer and, as such, may be unprivileged and
able to be subpoenaed from the taxpayer's lawyer. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31 (1973). Such
documents are not protected by the attorney-client privilege unless they would still be protected in the hands of
the taxpayer. See id. at 335-36. Nonetheless, the Court in Couch observed that "situations may well arise where
constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave
the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact." Id. at 333. As long as the lawyer does not
"actively participate in hiding an item" or "take possession of it in such a way that its discovery by the authorities
becomes less likely," the duties of confidentiality and loyalty to the client prevent the lawyer from turning over
potential physical, electronic, or documentary evidence to authorities. THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 81,
§ 10.46. This distinction underlies the famous "buried bodies case," in which defense counsel viewed the dead
bodies of their client's murder victims and moved them slightly to take pictures but did not make them harder to
discover. Id. § 10.46 n.178 (citing People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Cnty. Ct. 1975)).
127. In his discussion of the Russell case, Gillers describes one of Russell's safe options as leaving the
computer with the church leaders. Gillers, supra note 2, at 835-36. If Russell's act of viewing the images on the
computer constituted his taking possession of it, then this option would not be available. For a fuller discussion of
the position that a lawyer's brief examination of physical evidence does not constitute accepting possession of it,
see Uphoff, Physical Evidence Dilemma, supra note 2, at 1199.
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the intent of facilitating or encouraging the conduct. ... 128 One comment defines
"counseling" as "providing advice to the client about the legality of contemplated
activities with the intent of facilitating or encouraging the client's action."1 2 9 A
second comment addresses advising a client "about activity of doubtful legality":
A lawyer who proceeds reasonably to advise a client with the intent of
providing the client with legal advice on how to comply with the law does not
act wrongfully, even if the client employs that advice for wrongful purposes or
even if a tribunal later determines that the lawyer's advice was incorrect. 1 30
These two comments could be read to suggest that a lawyer could be disciplined
for giving the type of advice in our hypotheticals, but only if the circumstances
show that the lawyer's intent was to encourage illegal activity.
A third comment to section 94 of the Restatement states that a lawyer may not
advise "a client about the degree of risk that a law violation will be detected or
prosecuted" if "the circumstances indicate that the lawyer thereby intended to
counsel or assist the client's crime, fraud, or violation of a court order."1 3 1 This
comment is the most problematic for the lawyer rendering the advice in our
hypotheticals. It is critical that the criminal defense lawyer make it perfectly clear
that she is not directing or encouraging the client to destroy evidence. Nonetheless,
although the lawyer does not advise the clients to destroy the contraband, but
rather expressly states that is not what she is advising the client to do, some bar
disciplinary authorities might look to this language in the Restatement and find that
such advice was, in fact, designed to encourage the client to destroy the cocaine or
the pornographic images. Indeed, some reading this Article may believe that our
proffered advice crosses the line and is not permissible, and that the Restatement
supports their position.
We believe, however, that the Restatement does not contemplate the type of
situation in our hypotheticals. In our hypotheticals, the continued possession of
either the drugs or the child pornography is a crime. In both instances, turning over
the contraband would provide a sufficient basis for charges to be brought against a
loved one. It is exactly these types of situations where the Model Rules demand
that a lawyer give a client competent advice so that the client can make informed
choices. A lawyer must be able to advise a client of the legality of possible courses
of action, as well as the likely results of taking different courses of action, without
fear of criminal prosecution or disciplinary action; otherwise, the client's right to
access to sound legal advice would be seriously undermined. 13 2
128. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 94(2).
129. Id. § 94 cmt. a.
130. Id. § 94 cmt. c.
131. Id. § 94 cmt. f.
132. See Pepper, supra note 109, at 1587-89. In a series of cases dating to Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,
470 (1888), the Supreme Court has trumpeted the importance of ensuring a client's right to obtain sound legal
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In our view, the lawyer giving and the client seeking advice in our hypotheticals
face a more difficult dilemma than a lawyer confronts when advising a client about
enforcement policy in the type of situation the Restatement comment addresses. In
our hypotheticals, the lawyer is giving advice to clients who must choose either to
violate the law or to subject a loved one to near-certain criminal prosecution. In
contrast, in both of the Restatement's illustrations dealing with advising a client
about enforcement policies, each client has an option that does not force the client
to make a Hobson's choice. The first illustration involves advising a client about
enforcement policies of a gambling statute for card playing for money in a client's
home, 1 3 3 and the second illustration involves advising a client about tax-audit
likelihood for a client's possible false charitable deduction. 1 34 In both illustrations,
the client can easily opt to pursue a lawful alternative and does not risk being
involved in a continuing criminal violation such as possession of contraband like
drugs or child pornography. Thus, the Restatement's illustrations are so markedly
different from the situations posed by our hypotheticals that it is unlikely that the
Restatement's comment was intended to apply to the dilemmas faced by the lawyer
and clients in our hypotheticals.
The Restatement's only reference to the type of situations set forth in our
hypotheticals appears in a Reporter's Note. 13 5 In that note, it characterizes ABA
Criminal Justice Standard 4-4.6(d) as "problematical" when it "'suggest[s] that the
client destroy' contraband, such as illegal drugs, that the lawyer has received in the
course of a legal representation." 1 3 6 It states: "Contraband is both property that
may be illegal to possess and evidence that may be illegal to destroy. As discussed
in this Section, applicable law may require that contraband be turned over to
authorities."1 37
The key distinction between what the Restatement contemplates in its analysis
and our hypotheticals is that the Restatement assumes that the lawyer has taken
possession of the contraband, and we do not. When the client is the one possessing
the contraband, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination means that
the client, even if a suspect in an investigation, "cannot be required to produce
potentially incriminating documents, tape recordings, or even a weapon allegedly
used in the offense." 1 38 A logical extension of this Fifth Amendment right is that a
advice by protecting the attorney-client relationship, which depends on full and frank communication between
lawyer and client and which in turn promotes the public's interest in the fair administration of justice. See also
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating that the purpose of attorney-client privilege "is to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients").
133. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 94 cmt. f illus. 1.
134. See id. § 94 cmt. f illus. 2.
135. Id. § 119 reporter's note.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Reitz, supra note 2, at 578 (footnotes omitted). In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-11 (1976),
the Court stated that taxpayers under investigation for possible civil or criminal liability under federal income-tax
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competent lawyer advising such a client must be allowed to tell the client that the
client has no duty to turn over the incriminating evidence to the authorities, even
though counsel cannot store or conceal the evidence at counsel's office and would
be required to turn over the evidence if the lawyer accepted possession of it.
If, contrary to our advice, the lawyer has taken possession of contraband such as
child pornography, Sisk makes a compelling argument that destruction of the
contraband is consistent with legislative intent that outlawing possession of such
material will "encourage the possessors of such material to rid themselves of or
destroy the material."1 39 Sisk continues: "Given that the continued existence of the
contraband is the greater evil, preventing ongoing possession of the contraband by
the client and removing the items from circulation through destruction is the
commonsense solution."1 4 0 Similarly, destruction of contraband may be preferable
to continued possession in our hypotheticals involving drugs and child pornogra-
phy. If either client decides to destroy contraband after learning of the risks of
continuing to possess it-and learning of the lawyer's refusal to take possession of
the contraband or direct its destruction-then destruction may very well appear to
a client to be the lesser evil as compared to continued possession.
An additional policy reason that supports providing a client with information
concerning the risks of continuing to possess contraband or other potentially
inculpatory evidence is a client's right to a full understanding of the privilege
against self-incrimination. 141 The Government cannot compel a person to tes-
tify, 1 4 2 nor can it compel a sole proprietor to produce documentary evidence "if the
laws could be compelled to produce accountants' work papers without violating the Fifth Amendment. The Court
compared this production to a criminal defendant's being compelled to give a handwriting exemplar without
violating the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 411-12. The Court acknowledged, however, that whether the compelled act
of producing evidence is also "both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the Fifth
Amendment ... may instead depend on the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof." Id. at
410. After Fisher, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "rarely provides a constitutional
privilege to withhold documentary evidence and never provides a constitutional right to destroy evidence." JAMIE
S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 1.18 (2016).
139. Sisk, supra note 2, at 841 (quoting Child Pornography Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(1)(12),
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-27 (1996)). Sisk explains more fully that
while penalizing the possession of child pornography, findings enacted as part of a federal criminal
statute set out Congress's reasoning that "prohibiting the possession and viewing of child
pornography will encourage the possessors of such material to rid themselves of or destroy the
material, thereby helping to protect the victims of child pornography and to eliminate the market
for the sexual exploitative use of children."
Id. (quoting Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121(1)(12)).
140. Id. at 841-42 (footnotes omitted); see also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 3, Defense
Function 4-4.7.
141. This policy reason is briefly discussed, in the context of destruction of evidence relevant to potential civil
litigation, in the leading treatise concerning destruction of evidence. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 138, § 1.14.
142. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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act of production itself would be incriminating."1 4 3 Although courts have deter-
mined that the right against self-incrimination does not equate to a constitutional
right to destroy evidence, 1 4 a citizen should not be required to sacrifice his or her
Fifth Amendment right as a consequence of consulting with counsel and showing
counsel a baggie of cocaine or computer images. Nor should a client be deprived of
information about the law and counsel's competent advice simply because the
client may ultimately use the advice to destroy or conceal evidence. 14 5
In the final analysis, when it comes to a lawyer's advice to a client, disciplinary
authorities have found violations of state equivalents to Model Rule 1.2(d) only
when the lawyer has directed or encouraged a client to violate the law or to engage
in fraudulent conduct.1 4 6 Thus, the proper interpretation of Model Rule 1.2(d) and
its comments clearly allows a lawyer to give a client full and candid advice of the
legal predicament that the client finds herself in, so the client can make an
informed choice as to how to proceed. Given the language in Model Rule 1.2(d),
the legislative history of the rule,1 4 7 and bar authorities' approach in applying the
rule,1 48 the comments in the Restatement should not be read to bar a lawyer from
giving the advice that is clearly permitted by Model Rule 1.2.
Moreover, as noted earlier, the Restatement is not binding or primary authority,
but rather secondary authority. 14 9 That said, the Restatement is persuasive author-
ity, 15 0 and a lawyer asked to give advice in a situation similar to one of the
hypotheticals in this Article should be aware that there is some risk of disciplinary
action if he or she advises a client about the degree of risk of being prosecuted for
destruction of contraband should his or her advice become known. Despite that
minimal risk, we believe that such advice is justified in situations where continued
possession of contraband is itself a crime, and often a more serious crime than
destruction of the contraband. In other words, the client deserves to know the
likely consequences of different actions, especially if destruction of the contraband
is a less serious offense than continued possession, and turning the contraband
over to authorities would likely result in a prosecution for the more serious offense.
143. GORELICK ETAL., supra note 138, § 1.18 (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984)).
144. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 816 (1984) (stating that there is no constitutional right to
destroy evidence). Jamie Gorelick and her co-authors provide a good analysis of why courts have rejected
arguments that there is a right to destroy evidence. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 138, § 1.18.
145. See Pepper, supra note 109, at 1578.
146. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
147. For an analysis of the rule, see supra Section II.A.
148. For an analysis of disciplinary cases, see supra Section II.A.2.
149. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
150. See THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 81, § 1.22.
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III. THE LAW OF ADVISING CLIENTS ABOUT CONTRABAND AND OTHER EVIDENCE
OF CRIMES
Criminal statutes prohibiting the destruction of evidence are strictly construed
and usually require the Government to prove "that the defendant subjectively
knew that destroyed evidence was relevant to an official proceeding and specifi-
cally intended to obstruct the proceeding."15 1 In addition, other statutes may be
implicated, such as federal and state statutes prohibiting the misprision of felony.
As we discussed previously, the Government faces additional hurdles in proving
misprision of felony. 15 2
Although the Government faces various hurdles in proving that destruction of
contraband or possible evidence is a criminal offense, a lawyer advising a client
about the legality of destroying contraband or evidence of crime must be sensitive
to her own possible criminal liability and bar discipline. For example, a lawyer
who urges a client to destroy evidence could face prosecution as an aider or
abettor, 15 3 or could be charged with conspiracy to obstruct justice. 154 In addition,
counseling a client to violate the law is contrary to the ethics rules,15 5 and
violations of the ethics rules can give rise to bar disciplinary actions. 15 6
But is providing a client with an assessment of the risks and possible legal
consequences of destroying the contraband a violation of the law or the ethics
rules? It is not.
To violate a law such as tampering with evidence or obstruction of justice
requires affirmatively aiding in such destruction.15 7 At a minimum, this would
require a lawyer to advise a client to destroy the contraband. In terms of potential
bar discipline, we have already demonstrated, in Part II, that providing advice to a
client that includes an assessment of the risks and possible legal consequences of
destroying contraband is consistent with a lawyer's ethical obligations.
151. GORELICKETAL., supra note 138, § 5.1.
152. See supra Section II.A.1.
153. For example, federal law regarding accessories to crimes provides: "Whoever commits an offense against
the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012). The Model Penal Code provides, in pertinent part:
(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
(a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he
(i) solicits such other person to commit it, or
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it ....
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). As both federal law and the Model
Penal Code provide, to be an accessory or accomplice, a lawyer must at least urge or counsel a client to commit a
crime. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953), cert denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953) (finding
lawyer guilty of being an accessory where lawyer told client, over the phone, to throw away murder weapon).
154. See GORELICKETAL., supra note 138, § 17.13.
155. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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As long as a lawyer does not direct or recommend that a client destroy
contraband or evidence of a crime when such destruction would either be a crime
itself or facilitate the underlying crime, there should not be any criminal culpabil-
ity for the lawyer. The advice that we suggest in our hypotheticals falls short of
counseling destruction, though in both instances the clients may decide to destroy
the contraband. As Stephen Pepper concluded more than twenty years ago, both
the relevant laws and Model Rule 1.2(d) permit counseling a client about the law
and about enforcement of the law, even if the client subsequently decides to break
the law.1 58
IV. REVISITING THE CHOIRMASTER'S LAPTOP AND EVIDENCE OF CRIMES ON
ELECTRONIC DEVICES
A. Our Advice to the Church Leaders
So, how should Philip Russell have advised church leaders regarding the
choirmaster and the computer containing the images of child pornography? It is
not particularly surprising that these church leaders were reluctant to go to the
police. That reluctance may have been grounded in a desire to avoid a scandal and
unwanted publicity for the church; in a sense of compassion for and loyalty to a
longtime, valued employee; or in a judgment that the choirmaster's termination
was sufficient punishment for his misdeeds. Whatever the reason or reasons,
counsel should have fully explored the church leaders' motivations before render-
ing any advice as to what to do in the situation they faced. In addition, we believe
that a lawyer in Russell's position should have questioned the church officials on
the number of persons who knew about the pornographic images and on the nature
of any conversations with such persons about the choirmaster and the pornography.
After the lawyer gathered information about the church leaders' motivations and
other circumstances surrounding the discovery of the pornography, the conversa-
tion would proceed much like the conversations in the hypotheticals at the outset
of this Article. 15 9 The advice would include a discussion of the quandary they were
in-that it would be illegal to continue to possess the laptop with the images, to
conceal it, or, if an investigation were under way, to destroy or tamper with it or the
images.160 The advice would also include a discussion of the possibility of a
misprision-of-felony charge if they destroyed the images, even if no investigation
were under way. 161
158. See Pepper, supra note 109, at 1588-89.
159. For advice to a parent who finds his or her child's cocaine, see supra Section I.A, and for advice to a sister
concerning child pornography on her brother's computer, see supra Section I.B.
160. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. Connecticut does not have a statute for misprision of
felony, nor do the state's courts recognize it as a common-law offense. See Ciociola, supra note 38, at 710-32.
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The advice to the church leaders would raise some additional issues, though.
First, the advice would acknowledge that the church leaders are likely to be held to
a higher level of scrutiny and that they should consider special moral, social, and
political factors. 16 2 Such advice would likely go into greater detail than we offer
with the sample advice that follows:
Folks, you find yourselves in a very dicey situation. From what you have
shared with me, I understand why you do not wish to go to the police, and your
concerns and fears are very reasonable. On the other hand, I know you are all
aware of the criticism leveled against the authorities in the Catholic Church
and other churches that have covered up the criminal activities of priests and
ministers. If the choirmaster's criminal activities are leaked to the police at
some point and it is discovered that you not only were not forthcoming with
information but actively concealed the computer, then you are likely to face
harsh criticism. Moreover, along with public condemnation, you may face
criminal charges and possible civil liability if the choirmaster sexually as-
saulted or exploited any children in your congregation. Your discovery of what
the choirmaster has done also raises serious moral and social issues about your
obligations as church leaders to the children in the photos, to your congrega-
tion, and to the general public.
Second, the lawyer should explain why he or she cannot take possession of the
computer:
You should also know, as I advised you at the beginning of our discussion-
everything you have told me is confidential. I am obligated to keep confidential
the fact that the choirmaster committed a crime and that you are now in
possession of a computer containing pornographic images. I have no duty to
report any of this to the police. To the contrary, I have an ethical duty to protect
your confidential communications. My duty would get very complicated,
however, if I were to take possession of the computer. It would be relatively
simple if you gave it to me because you want me to give it to the police or
prosecutor. I can certainly do that, but it is very likely that the choirmaster will
be arrested and charged with a crime. I cannot take the computer and store it in
my office because I would then be in possession of child pornography and so
guilty of a crime. Moreover, your act of giving the computer to me knowing it
contained images of child pornography but asking me that I not turn the
evidence over to the police may make you guilty of delivering child pornogra-
phy, a more serious crime than either possessing the pornography or destroying
it. The bottom line is that I will not take possession of the computer unless you
decide you want me to turn it over to the authorities.
162. Rule 2.1 of the ABA Model Rules states: "In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation." MODEL RULES, supra note 1, r. 2.1. In our opinion, advising the church leaders in the situation they
faced would entail raising such issues, which we do not explore fully for the purposes of our sample advice.
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Third, the lawyer should explain that the church leaders do not know whether
the choirmaster has communicated with others about the pornography on the
computer, and that if the police learn about the computer they may come and ask
for it should the church leaders decide to retain it. That advice could go like this:
Finally, in deciding what to do in this situation, you should take into
consideration the possibility that the choirmaster may have communicated
with others about the fact that there are pornographic images on the computer.
So, despite your desire to see this messy business end with his departure, never
to be seen or heard from again, it may well not end so neatly. If the police learn
in some fashion about his activities and come to the church seeking access to
the computer, then their investigation may uncover either the images on the
computer or that the images have been erased or destroyed. If the police do
come asking about the computer, I would encourage you to decline to answer
any questions about the choirmaster or the computer and ask instead that your
lawyer be called immediately. In any event, I do not think we can safely
assume that the matter will just go away quietly.
It is very likely that the church leaders may ask for counsel's recommendation or
what counsel would do if facing such a predicament. Once again, a lawyer may
answer, "I don't feel comfortable giving you a recommendation in this situation. I
am not in your position, so I really cannot say how I would proceed in your
situation." We would take a different approach in this situation, however, and we
would proffer more specific advice due to the different risks that the church leaders
face in this situation. Our additional advice would go something like this:
I am not in your position, and what might be the best choice for me might
not be the best for you given that we may not share the same backgrounds,
perspectives, and capacities for risk. Nonetheless, I would not want to possess
or have the church possess a computer with pornographic images. I certainly
would consider just deleting the images and hoping that the police never come
to the church in the next year. Then I might replace the computer in a year and
destroy this one. If the police have not started an investigation in that time, then
I think I could safely assume that the computer could be destroyed without
any negative consequences. On the other hand, I would be very concerned,
even in the short run, about concealing the computer at the church. I would be
more inclined to tell the choirmaster, upon advice of counsel, that I was turning
the computer over to the police. I would tell the choirmaster to seek advice of
counsel immediately so that his lawyer could contact my lawyer and arrange to
go to the police jointly. Such an approach would allow me to avoid committing
any crime, avoid the church's being involved in a cover up, improve the
likelihood of the choirmaster's getting favorable treatment, and ulti-
mately pursue the best long-term interest of the church. Also, if there were any
chance that the choirmaster has been producing child pornography or abusing
any children, then getting law enforcement involved would stop the choirmas-
ter. Involving law enforcement also seems to me to be the best way to take into
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consideration special moral, social, and political factors that I would have as a
church leader. This would seem to be in the best interests of the children whose
images are trafficked, of the general public, and of promoting the values of the
church and congregation.
This would be our recommended advice were our clients confronted with the
situation that the church leaders faced. While some clients in a similar position
may believe that it would be in the church's best interest to destroy the porno-
graphic images or the hard drive, the risk to the church and the church leaders is
too great to do so. While they may think that they would be destroying all the
choirmaster's pornography, they could not be sure. They also could not be sure that
others in the church had not already discussed seeing the pornography on the
computer with others. 1 6 3 There is also the risk that the choirmaster may have
sexually exploited members of the congregation, and they have a greater duty to
report the choirmaster's crime than a parent or sibling, as in our hypotheticals.
In the lawyer's role as advisor, the lawyer may raise moral, economic, and other
considerations relevant to a client's situation in addition to legal implications. 164
Given the predicament of the church leaders, a lawyer would be acting ethically if
the lawyer raised both the moral and reputational dimensions with his or her
clients, even if the clients did not ask the lawyer about those possible issues. In the
end, however, if the clients decided not to heed the lawyer's advice and decided
instead to destroy the computer, then the lawyer would be obligated to accept the
clients' decision and maintain client confidentiality.1 6 5
B. Advice to Clients About Evidence on Electronic Devices
Increasingly, clients who have potential evidence on their cellphones or smart-
phones are consulting lawyers. In reviewing texts on a client's phone, defense
counsel may confront the question of what advice she can give a client about
deleting texts on the phone. Assume, for example, that your nineteen-year-old
client is charged with having sex with a sixteen-year-old. The alleged victim
contends that your client forced her against her will to have sex. Your client says
that the sixteen-year-old willingly had sex and had in fact been aggressively
pursuing him for some time.
163. Sisk similarly believes that a lawyer in Russell's situation should not have taken possession of the laptop
and that he should have advised the church leaders to turn it over to law enforcement immediately. Sisk, supra
note 2, at 854-55.
164. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, r. 2.1; see also supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
165. Most states follow Model Rule 1.6, which defines a lawyer's duty of confidentiality. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 1, r. 1.6. The rule requires that a lawyer keep confidential any information relating to the representation
of a client, subject to very limited, discretionary exceptions. See id. The exception for future crimes is limited to
situations where disclosure is necessary either "to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm,"
id. r. 1.6(b)(1), or "to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or
is using the lawyer's services," id. r. 1.6(b)(2).
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Upon reviewing the texts on your client's iPhone, you see several texts from the
complaining witness that support your client's story that she had been sending him
provocative photos with messages clearly indicating she wanted to have sex with
him. On the other hand, while the texts support your client and would enable
defense counsel to impeach the sixteen-year-old about several matters, the saved
texts also confirm that your client was to meet up with the alleged victim on the
night of the alleged rape and that your client had sex with her. Given that, under
state law, your client is guilty of a crime even if the sex was consensual,1 6 6 what
obligation does defense counsel have now that she has reviewed the cellphone and
sees that it contains both exculpatory and incriminating evidence?
If the client is still at the lawyer's office, then defense counsel should tell him
that counsel will not take possession of the iPhone. 6 7 Counsel should explain that
she cannot take possession of the phone because, if she does, then under ethics
rules and case law she may be obligated to turn the phone over to the police or
prosecuting authorities. Counsel cannot conceal physical evidence of a crime in
her office, destroy such evidence, or assist another in the destruction of it. The texts
on the iPhone constitute incriminating evidence because they would help to prove
that the client had sex with the alleged victim. Counsel is duty-bound to defend her
client zealously, so she does not want to have to turn over incriminating informa-
tion that might assist in her client's prosecution.
The client would undoubtedly ask what he should do with the iPhone. Counsel
could respond as follows:
It is possible that the prosecutor will seek to obtain a warrant to seize and
search your iPhone. The prosecutor would need probable cause to believe
evidence of a crime existed on your iPhone. I do not know if the prosecutor
would be able to obtain a warrant, but that depends on what the complaining
witness has said about your texts and what, if any, messages exist on her
phone. Since your phone contains potential incriminating evidence, I cannot
ethically or legally advise you to delete or erase those messages. Indeed, since
you have a case pending against you, I could be criminally charged for
encouraging you to destroy evidence.
Moreover, if you do delete messages on your phone, then you might face an
additional criminal charge of tampering with evidence or obstruction of
justice.i1s I do not want to see you be charged with any additional crimes or to
166. Every state has laws prohibiting sexual activity with someone under a certain age. Kate Sutherland, From
Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 Wm. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 313, 313 (2003). The age of consent for sexual intercourse varies by state and ranges from twelve to
eighteen. Id. at 314.
167. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
168. State laws for tampering with evidence, which includes deleting images or text with evidentiary value,
vary greatly. For an analysis of tampering-with-evidence laws, see supra Section H.A.1. Even if a state had a
misprision-of-felony statute, such charges would usually require covering up another person's crime. See supra
notes 37-3 8.
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find myself accused of encouraging you to destroy evidence. So, I am warning
you not to erase the messages on your iPhone. You have a right to know,
however, that the penalties for tampering with or destroying evidence are
significantly less than the penalties you could receive for the crime you now
face. 169 Unlike me, you are not obligated to turn over potential incriminating
evidence to the police voluntarily. You have a constitutional right against
self-incrimination. So, if the police contact you and attempt to question you,
then you should refuse to answer any questions or to show them your iPhone.
Rather, you should tell them you are invoking your Fifth Amendment right and
do not want to say anything until I am present.
The situation is more complicated if the client has dropped off the iPhone and
left the office. Is defense counsel now obligated to turn the phone with potential
incriminating evidence over to law-enforcement authorities, or may she return the
iPhone to the client? Unquestionably, there is case law that would demand that
counsel in this situation turn the phone over to the police even absent any demand
by the prosecution. 170 The Restatement also insists that a defense lawyer turn over
physical incriminating evidence in counsel's possession.1 7 1 We previously have
argued in support of the principle that defense counsel in such a situation may
return an evidentiary item, such as this iPhone, to the source-in this case, the
client. 1 7 2 The law in some jurisdictions forecloses this option, which is why
counsel should be wary of ever accepting possession of incriminating physical
evidence. 173
Assume instead that the sixteen-year-old's stepmother comes to your office and
hands you her stepdaughter's iPhone. The stepmother says her stepdaughter is on
her phone plan and she pays for the phone. She has come to defense counsel
because she is upset that her stepdaughter has been sending nude photos of herself
to your client and has made false allegations against him. She tells you that the
iPhone messages will show that her stepdaughter is lying.
If the stepmother brought the iPhone to the office, and the defense lawyer
reviewed it in the presence of the stepmother and found that it contained
incriminating as well as exculpatory texts, then counsel should proceed as
suggested earlier. That is, counsel should not take possession of the iPhone.
Counsel may decide to have a paralegal, investigator, or law clerk look at-and
take a photo of-the exculpatory messages so that the person could be called to
169. Although penalties for sexual assault vary throughout the United States, the penalties for tampering with
evidence or obstructing justice will very likely be less serious.
170. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 E2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that a lawyer who takes
possession of an item with evidentiary value must turn it over to the prosecution once removed from its location).
171. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 119.
172. Uphoff, Physical Evidence Dilemma, supra note 2, at 1198-1203; see also Sisk, supra note 2, at 867-72.
173. Both case law and court rule in Alaska require that defense counsel who takes possession of physical
evidence immediately notify the prosecutor and arrange to turn over the evidence to the prosecutor within a
reasonable time. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(6).
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impeach the stepdaughter should she deny sending such photos or messages to the
client. Counsel should explain that, while she appreciates the stepmother's
willingness to help, and the messages on the phone do help prove that her
stepdaughter is a liar, some of the messages also are unhelpful. Thus, counsel
should tell the stepmother that she will not take possession of the phone because
she would then be obligated to turn the phone over to the police or prosecuting
authorities. Counsel also has a duty to zealously defend her client, so she does not
want to be in a position to have to turn over unhelpful information to the authorities
that might assist in her client's prosecution.
The stepmother will undoubtedly ask what she should do with the phone.
Counsel should tell her that, because she is not a client, counsel cannot provide her
with any legal advice.1 7 4 Because it is her stepdaughter's phone, it is probably best
for the stepmother simply to return it to her. Counsel may inform the stepmother
that, if the case later proceeds to trial, and the stepdaughter denies sending photos
to the client and aggressively pursuing him, then the lawyer might call the
stepmother as a witness to impeach the stepdaughter. The stepmother may be
permitted to testify about the photos she saw on the phone even if she returns
the phone to the stepdaughter, who might in turn erase the images on the phone.
Whenever a case is pending, a lawyer must be clear not to advise a client or
anyone else to delete material that could be evidence in that case, such as text
messages or emails. Advising a client to destroy such material would constitute
counseling the destruction of evidence, which is a criminal act and may also
violate other laws. Such advice would make the lawyer an accomplice1 7 5 and
would also subject the lawyer to possible professional discipline.
174. The ethics rules provide that, in dealing with an unrepresented person, a lawyer "shall not give legal
advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the
interests of the client." MODEL RULES, supra note 1, r. 4.3. A lawyer may be disciplined for violating this ethics
rule. See, e.g., In re Tun, 26 A.3d 313 (D.C. 2011) (disciplining lawyer for giving legal advice to non-client in
murder case). Some authority also states that if a lawyer gives advice to a person, who then relies upon that advice
to his or her detriment, then the lawyer has created an attorney-client relationship that could be the basis for a
malpractice claim. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980) (holding
that an attorney's giving legal advice to a person creates an attorney-client relationship, even if the lawyer does
not enter into an agreement to represent the person). For these reasons, a lawyer should not give legal advice to
any non-client, particularly where that non-client's interests may be or become in conflict with a client's interests,
unless the lawyer wants to be potentially liable for giving negligent advice.
175. Mary Jill Donovan, a criminal defense lawyer in Cincinnati, was indicted on federal charges of
conspiracy to obstruct justice for advising a client facing drug charges to destroy the SIM card in his cellphone.
Amber Hunt, LawyerAwaits Jury's Verdict in Obstruction Case, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Oct. 10, 2014, 11:33 PM),
https://perma.cc/LR8V-TXR3. The Government contended that Donovan likely knew that a federal investigation
of her client was under way; she replied, in defense, that she wanted her client to destroy privileged
communication in the form of text messages between her and her client. Id. A jury found her not guilty. Amber
Hunt, Defense Lawyer Not Guilty of Conspiracy, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Oct. 15, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://perma.
cc/CUA9-HREX.
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If, however, a client seeks advice regarding potential incriminating texts or
photos on his or her phone, and the client does not have a pending case-nor is one
imminent or reasonably foreseeable-then the lawyer is in a very different
situation. In such an instance, the lawyer may ask the client regarding his or her
general practice of storing texts and photos. Counsel may alert the client to the
potential danger of routinely keeping potentially incriminating items on his or her
phone. Counsel may also explain that, if at some point an investigation is
launched, then it may be a crime at that point to delete such material. But, since
there is no pending investigation or reasonable expectation of one being started, it
would not be criminal for the client to delete material from the phone. 176 The
counseling session may then proceed as in the hypotheticals discussed above.
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, many law-abiding persons finding contraband, such as drugs or
child pornography, possessed by a family member will confront the family
member and then either destroy the contraband or watch the family member
destroy it and hope that ends the matter. Some, however, will choose to consult a
lawyer. So, too, employers, such as the church leaders in Russell, and other
individuals who find contraband or other evidence of a crime are particularly likely
to consult a lawyer.
In every type of situation, effective, ethical advice involves informing clients
about the law and providing an honest assessment of the consequences they face if
they take any of various courses of action. In some instances, such as that of the
church leaders in the Russell case, a lawyer giving advice should raise not only the
greater legal risks of not going to law enforcement but also the special moral,
social, and political considerations for the clients. In other instances, such as those
in our hypotheticals, considerations for family members who may have committed
crimes should also be discussed.
Clients confronting dilemmas like those that the parent and sister faced in our
two hypotheticals deserve the effective assistance of counsel. They should not be
put in a worse legal predicament because they sought that assistance. Put simply,
the law and ethics rules should not be structured or interpreted to prohibit a lawyer
from explaining the law and predicting the likely consequences of various courses
of action. We believe that we have made the case that a lawyer may give such
advice. To construe the ethics rules and law differently would, in essence, punish
clients who seek legal assistance and would threaten the public interest in the fair
administration of justice.1 7 7
176. The position of most courts and at least one ethics opinion "is that destruction of evidence is
unethical ... when the evidence is relevant to a reasonably foreseeable or pending legal proceeding." GORELICK
ETAL., supra note 138, § 7.1.
177. As the Court observed in Upjohn, the rationale for the attorney-client privilege is "founded upon the
necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and
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Rather, clients should be advised about the law related to the tricky legal
situations in which they are entangled and should receive an honest assessment of
the consequences they face. Clients deserve straightforward advice, not vague
pronouncements that leave them uncertain of what will happen to them should they
choose to act in a particular way. No client can make a truly informed choice about
what to do with physical evidence or contraband without access to competent legal
advice. And no lawyer should face criminal or ethics charges merely for providing
clients with good-faith advice designed to give them a full and honest appraisal of
their options.
skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences
or the apprehension of disclosure." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Hunt v.
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).
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